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CORPORATIONS
ERNEST L. FoLK, ]MI*
I. MERGER
A corporation law topic of national interest and importance,
sparked by recent decisions in Delaware and elsewhere,' is the
doctrine of de facto merger. Merger (or consolidation) is the
traditional device for combining corporations, or, at least, it is
the device originally recognized by corporation statutes and sing-
led out for rather full regulation.2 Thus, the new South Carolina
statutes authorizes mergers and consolidations,3 prescribes in de-
tail their consequences,4 and gives appraisal rights to share-
holders of all participating corporations.5 Merger is not, how-
ever, the sole, or even most commonly used, technique of corpor-
ate fusion. More commonly a corporation will sell its assets, us-
ually for the purchaser's shares, and may thereafter dissolve and
distribute these shares in liquidation. Or Corporation A will
purchase all or a substantial number of Corporation B's shares
from the B shareholders, usually for a consideration consisting of
A shares; thereafter A may dissolve B, thereby acquiring the B
assets, or it may continue to operate B as a subsidiary. These
examples reveal how a merger-like result can be brought about
by coupling statutory dissolution proceedings with a sale of as-
sets or an exchange of shares. The de facto merger doctrine
broadly stated, recognizes the power of courts to inquire whether
a sale of assets or exchange of shares is "really" a merger with
the statutory incidents of a merger. The issue is especially im-
portant in connection with appraisal rights. Although statutes
almost invariably grant such rights to everyone in a merger, only
one-half of the states recognize them in a sale of assets even for
* Associate Professor, School of Law, University of North Carolina. Form-
erly Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law.
1. See cases cited note 21 infra.
2. Sales of assets are much more briefly provided for in statutes, e.g., S.C.
CODE §§ 12-21.1 to -21.5 (Supp. 1962). Statutes rarely do more than merely
authorize corporations to purchase shares of other corporations, e.g., S.C. CODE
§ 12-12.2(a) (14) (A) (Supp. 1962). The reason, probably, is that conceptually
a merger is a very drastic change, involving as it does the disappearance of the
corporate entity of at least one of the participating corporations, while sale of
assets and exchange of shares do not of themselves bring about such traumatic
changes.
3. S.C. CODE §§ 12-20.1 (merger), 12-20.2 (consolidation) (Supp. 1962).
4. S.C. CODE § 12-20.6 (Supp. 1962).
5. S.C. CODE § 12-20.9 (Supp. 1962).
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the shareholders of the selling corporation. 6 They are rarely if
ever available to the shareholders of the purchasing corporation,7
and have never been granted by statute to any shareholders in
connection with a corporate fusion by way of an exchange of
shares.8 As a result, corporate managers try to put corporations
together so as to avoid appraisal rights, while disgruntled share-
holders seek to enjoin the transaction or contend that it is a mer-
ger although in form an assets sale or exchange of shares.
South Carolina has had only peripheral encounters with the
de facto merger doctrine, since the court has never been squarely
faced with the question in the context of shareholders' demand
for appraisal rights, as have the courts in Delaware, Pennsyl-
vania, or New Jersey.9 In Beckroge v. SoutA Caroina Power
Co.,'0 involving a creditor's claim against corporate assets which
had been sold to another corporation, the court recognized the
existence of the de facto merger doctrine when it asserted that
The transfer of the assets of one corporation to another may
amount to a merger in fact, although the corporate existence
of the transferrer [sic] continues. Where such is the case,
equity looks past the form and at the real effect of the trans-
action, and by an application of the trust fund doctrine
holds the transferee liable to the extent of the assets received,
as in such case it is not a bona fide purchaser for value.11
This dictum is simply a statement, in de facto merger terms, of
the disposition of courts to attach the selling corporation's lia-
bilities to the assets acquired by the purchaser, to avoid injury
to the seller's creditors.'
2
In Stephenson Fin. Co. v. SoutA Caroina Tax COMm'n,'3 the
court had another brush with the de facto merger concept, but in
6. See the tabulation in Manning, The Shareholder Appraisal Remedy: An
Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 233, 262-65 (1962).
7. The only instance appears to be PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-311(F)
(Supp. 1961) granting appraisal rights to shareholders of a purchasing corpo-
ration when the assets acquisition is "accomplished by the issuance of more than
a majority of the voting shares of such corporation to be outstanding immedi-
ately after the acquisition." This statute was partly designed to recognize,
partly to draw the sting from, Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143
A.2d 25 (1959).
8. This is the negative implication of Manning, stpra note 6 at 262-65, and
was so stated in note, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1132, 1142 (1959).
9. See cases cited note 21 infra.
10. 197 S.C. 184, 15 S.E.2d 124 (1941).
11. Id. at 194-95, 15 S.E.2d at 128.
12. For a concise survey of these problems, see LATT N, CoaroRIAoNs 542-47
(1959).
13. 242 S.C. 98, 130 S.E.2d 72 (1963). This case is also noted in the Ad-
ministrative Law section at note 91 and in the Taxation section at note 40.
1963]
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol16/iss1/7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAw REw
the context, not of a sale of assets, but of an exchange of shares.
There an automobile finance company, seeking control of two
insurance companies with which it did business, "accomplished
this purpose by exchanging its own stock for that of the share-
holders of the insurance companies on a book value basis," an
exchange solely "between the individual shareholders [of the
insurance companies] and the finance company," involving "no
corporate action" on the part of the insurance companies. 14 "Each
of the three corporations retained its corporate existence, assets
and liabilities and each continued to conduct the business author-
ized by its charter.""' The issue was whether this transaction
was "a reorganization, consolidation or merger" exempted from
taxation under the then applicable South Carolina tax law.'0
Holding that the transaction was not exempt, the court rejected
a de facto merger contention by the corporations-surely an un-
usual source for this argument but understandable in the factual
situation. The court stressed that since no merger or consoli-
dation "can be lawfully accomplished without compliance with
the terms of the statute,"'17 the exchange of shares, which was
clearly a different sort of fusion technique, was not a merger,
de facto or de jure. Alternatively, "neither nor consolidation was
intended or effected,' 3 and, indeed, this would have defeated the
objective of maintaining the three companies as separate entities.
Finally, two distinctive hallmarks of a merger were absent: "A
transfer of assets and assumption of liabilities.' 9
The court's decision is unquestionably sound. If ever there was
a transaction which was not a de facto merger, it was this, where
separate corporate entities were strictly maintained, and where
the exchange of shares was obviously not a device to get at the
underlying assets of the subsidiaries. It is, of course, unfortunate
that the now superseded provisions of the state tax law failed
to give an exemption whatever the technique used; but this de-
ficiency could not be remedied by the court except by rewriting
the unmistakable terms of the statute. Thus, the court rightly
14. Id. at 101, 125 S.E.2d at 73.
15. Id. at 101-02, 125 S.E.2d at 73.
16. S.C. COun § 65-275 (1952) : "In a reorganization, consolidation or merger
the exchange of stock or property for stock of a corporation a party to the
reorganization, consolidation or merger shall not be deemed to result in gain
or loss."
17. Stephenson Fin. Co. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 242 S.C. 98, 105,
130 S.E.2d 72, 75 (1963).
18. Ibid.
19. Id. at 105, 130 S.E2d at 76.
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resisted the temptation, if it felt any, to produce a result in
harmony with federal tax law exemptions and with the subse-
quent revision of the state income tax statute.
20
We can only speculate on the implications of the decision for
future cases squarely presenting the de facto merger contention
in a corporate law context. Stephenson holds only that one cor-
poration's acquisition of control of another by an exchange of
shares is not of itself a merger. There were no further trans-
actions to produce a merger-like result such as a transfer of as-
sets from the new subsidiary to the parent, liquidation of the sub-
sidiary, or an assumption of the new subsidiary's liabilities. Cer-
tainly, it is bad logic to argue from Stephenson that the presence
of one or more of these features would mean that a transaction
is a merger "in substance" or de facto, although in form and in-
tention a sale of assets or exchange of shares. It should never
be forgotten that a decision to apply or not apply the de facto
merger concept is purely a policy question, and more specifically
one which the courts have to face themselves since the doctrine
is a judicial, not a legislative, invention. Application of the
doctrine is a matter of sharp dispute among the courts.21 Since
Stephenson very wisely avoids implying, let alone dictating, any
rule on this question, the application and scope of the de facto
merger concept is still a completely open question in South Caro-
lina law.
It may be noted that the occasions under the new South Caro-
lina Corporation Law for invoking the de facto merger concept
are limited to rather special situations. Under the statute, ap-
praisal rights are available for shareholders of all corporations
participating in a merger,22 and for the shareholders of a cor-
20. By defining "reorganization" in harmony with INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 368, the new South Carolina statute precludes a repetition of the Stephenson
holding. S.C. CODE § 65-275 (1962).
21. Compare Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. S.Ct.
1963) (no de facto merger although sale of assets was coupled with mandatory
plan to liquidate selling corporation and distribute to its shareholders the selling
corporation's shares) with Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d
25 (1958) (comparable, but not identical situation). Also compare Orzeck v.
Englehart, 192 A.2d 26 (Del. Ch. 1963) (finding no de facto merger on ex-
change of shares) with Applestein v. United Bd. & Carton Corp., 33 N.J.
Super. 333, 159 A.2d 146, aff'd per curiam, 33 NJ. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960)
(exchange of shares; situation similar to Farris case). For a discussion of all
of these cases, see Folk, De Facto Mergers in Delaware: Hariton v. Arco
Electronics, Inc., 49 VA. L. REv. (1963).
22. S.C. CODE § 12-20.9 (Supp. 1962).
1963]
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poration selling its assets.23 This contrasts with Delaware which
grants appraisal rights only in a merger,24 but not in a sale of
assets, and thus affords a built-in incentive to cast a corporate
combination in the form of an assets sale. The chief advantage
of doing so under the South Carolina law is that a sale of assets
will require paying cash only to dissenters of the selling, but
not of the purchasing, corporation, whereas the same transaction
cast in the form of a merger or consolidation will require ap-
praisal rights for both participating corporations. Thus, a dis-
senting shareholder of a corporation purchasing another corpo-
ration's assets might insist on appraisal rights on the theory that
this is a de facto merger.25 A second possible occasion for argu-
ing the de facto merger concept is an exchange of shares coupled
with liquidation of the acquired corporation. The out-of-state de-
cisions disagree as to whether such a transaction is a de facto
merger.20 However, it is clear that if it is not, it is possible to
combine corporations without appraisal rights for anyone.
27
II. OTHER CASES
Corporation law points were considered only incidentally in
two other cases during the Survey period. Bulova TVatc7 Go. v.
23. S.C. CODE § 12-20.5 (Supp. 1962) entitles [a]ny shareholder of a corpo-
ration ... to dissent from the sale of all or substantially all of the property
and assets of the corporation ...."
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1953).
25. Shareholders of the purchaser have the least chance of success since the
award of appraisal rights to shareholders of the seller arguably implies the
exclusion of the purchasing corporation's shareholders. Heilbrunn v. Sun
Chem. Corp., 38 Del. Ch. 321, 159 A.2d 755 (Del. S. Ct. 1959), denied standing
to shareholders of the purchasing corporation to raise the de facto merger issue,
and Orzeck v. Englehart, 192 A.2d 26 (Del. Ch. 1963), in effect, did the same
when an exchange of shares was challenged by a shareholder of the corporation
initiating the exchange.
26. The conflict, scarcely irreconcilable in view of significant factual differ-
ences, is represented by Orzeck v. Englehart and Applestein v. United Board
& Carton Corp., cited in full, note 21 supra.
27. A third possible occasion for invoking de facto merger concepts is the so-
called "upside-down" transaction, represented by Farris v. Glen Alden Corp.,
393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958) (alternative holding) (sale of assets) and
Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 33 N.J. Super. 333, 159 A.2d 146,
aff'd per curiam, 33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960) (exchange of shares). Thus,
a sale of assets is said to be "upside-down" when the nominal purchaser is the
"real" seller of assets. An extreme hypothetical example would be a $100,000
corporation purchasing the assets of a $10,000,000 corporation. "Upside-down"
features have been used by courts to find a de facto merger, Farris v. Glen
Alden Corp., supra, or to realign the participating corporations to discover the
"true" seller and purchaser, Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., supra; Applestein v.
United Board & Carton Corp., supra. Some features of these odd transactions,
heavily obscured by judicial misunderstanding, are analyzed in Folk, note 21
.rupra.
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Roberts Jewelers28 posed, but did not have to decide, the question
whether a corporation whose charter has been canceled by the
Secretary of State may survive as a de facto corporation, thus
saving shareholders from personal liability. The holding of
personal liability rested upon the fact that the "shareholder" of
the dissolved corporation had not "ordered these goods as agent
or representative of another."2 9 But the court noted "grave
doubt" whether the members of a corporation, whose charter has
been forfeited, may continue to do business as a de facto corpo-
ration, especially when there is only one "shareholder" left. 0
Southern Frozen Foods, Inc. v. HilZ31 held that the pre-existing
debt of a corporation was a sufficient valuable consideration
for the personal note of the principal shareholders.
III. STATUTES
The 1963 General Assembly passed a bill, prepared by the Joint
Committee on Corporation Laws, amending the Corporation Act
of 1962. Most of the amendments are clarifying; none of them
significantly changes the basic statute. The amendments were
drafted and approved by the Joint Committee, and represent an
effort to perfect the statute. Most of the amendments are dis-
cussed or cited in a recent article in the Law Review's Symposium
on Corporation Law, 2 and since the bill was passed virtually
28. 240 S.C. 280, 125 S.E.2d 643 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Agency section at note 1 and in the Pleading section at note 23.
29. Id. at 284, 125 S.E2d at 645.
30. Ibid. One should note the shift in connotation in the words "de facto"
when referring to the "de facto corporation" rule and the "de facto merger"
concept. Both are, of course, judicially fashioned doctrines. But the court
invokes the de facto corporation rule to recognize and uphold the corporate
entity of a corporation which is defectively organized because of some failure
to comply with the statutory incorporation procedure. See, e.g., Meyer v.
Brunson, 104 S.C. 84, 88 S.E. 359 (1915), applying the old South Carolina
statute, S.C. CODE § 12-62 (1962), which in effect codifies the de facto corpora-
tion rule. For the new law, see S.C. CODE § 12-14. 5(b) (Supp. 1962). In
contrast, under the de facto merger doctrine, a transaction complying precisely
with the prescribed statutory procedures, e.g., sale of assets plus dissolution,
is set aside by the court, and some quite different incidents of another statutory
procedure-merger-are attached to it. Thus one doctrine carries out, while
the other substantially defeats, the intentions of the actors.
31. 241 S.C. 524, 129 S.E.2d 420 (1963). This case is also noted in the
Commercial Transaction section at note 32.
32. See Folk, The South Carolina Corporation Law: Reconsiderations and
Prospects, 15 S.C.L. REv. 467 (1963).
19631
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unchanged, these explanations are still applicable.33 A schedule
of fees and taxes under the new Corporation Law was also
enacted.3 '
33. The Joint Committee on Corporation Laws plans to issue an up-to-date
version of the corporation statute, annotated with the Reporter's Notes which
will be revised and rewritten to take account of the 1963 Amendments.
34. S.C. AcTs 1963, Act No. 141.
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